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I. INTRODUCTION
Quickly, bring me a beaker of wine, so that I may wet my mind
and say something clever.
Aristophanes (448-385 B.C.)1
HE legal landscape of state power under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution has been undergoing intense scru-
tiny in both federal courts and state legislatures and will soon be
1. All historical wine quotations used in this article, with the exception of the last,




addressed by the Supreme Court.2 States in the spotlight allow in-state
wineries to ship wine directly to in-state consumers while simultaneously
restricting out-of-state wineries from shipping directly to those same con-
sumers. These states argue they have virtually total control and immunity
when exercising their Twenty-first Amendment power-a states' rights
claim.3 On the other hand, consumers and wineries, particularly smaller,
family-owned operations excluded from the established "bricks-and-mor-
tar," state-mandated distribution systems, want access to products and
markets and the freedom to engage in interstate trade-a dormant Com-
merce Clause challenge.4
The crux of the current direct shipment debate is whether a state is
limited in its power to control the flow of alcohol into its borders, in par-
2. On May 24, 2004, the Court consolidated petitions for review of the Second and
Sixth Circuit decisions to consider the question: Does a state's regulatory scheme that per-
mits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-
of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment? See Mich. Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Heald, 124 S. Ct.
2389 (2004).
State legislatures are also actively addressing the scope of their regulatory powers under
the Twenty-first Amendment. Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina each enacted
corrective legislation allowing the direct shipment of wine by both in-state and out-of-state
wineries, while the Texas Senate passed a bill which would allow for the direct shipment of
wine into the state. However, the Texas bill was not passed quickly enough to get before
the House by the regular session recess. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-112.1 (Michie 2003); 2003
N.C. Sess. Laws S.L. 2003-402; S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-745 (Law. Co-op. 2003); Tex. S.B.
770, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003).
3. Brief for Petitioners at 24, Granholm v. Heald, 72 U.S.L.W. 3600, 3722 & 3725
(U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1116); Brief of Ohio and 32 Other States as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 4, Granholm v. Heald, 2004 WL 1743941 (U.S. July 29, 2004)
(No. 03-1116).
4. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 7-12, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 72 U.S.L.W. 3600,
3722 & 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1274).
The vast majority of the nation's over 3,000 wineries are small, family-owned businesses.
Id. at 6 (citing the Tax and Trade Bureau). There are a few, such as Gallo, which are
volume producers that have no trouble getting wholesaler attention because they can ex-
ceed the threshold of 10,000 cases for profitable pick-up by licensed wholesalers. Tele-
phone Interview with Sherry Muller, Chief of Staff for Tex. Sen. Frank Madla (San
Antonio) (Jan. 29, 2004). Ms. Muller has studied the direct shipment issue for almost a
decade and has assisted Senator Madla in his attempts over the last several regular legisla-
tive sessions to provide for the permitting of and direct shipment by out-of-state wineries
to Texas residents for personal use. E.g., Tex. S.B. 770, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003); Tex. S.B.
489, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001); Tex. S.B. 702, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
There are also a few exclusive wineries, such as Leonitti Cellar in Washington State, that
are so coveted they sell every bottle they make in one day (with a two-year waiting list
remaining) and have no need for distribution. Id. However, "[t]he challenge for [all the
rest of the] wineries is finding a way to allow consumers to buy the wines that they tasted
when visiting the winery. In a 2003 survey of Wine Institute members, 54 percent of the
wineries indicated that they have been unable to gain access to another state due to an
inability to find a wholesaler who was willing to carry their brands. This is so because the
number of wineries has dramatically grown, while the number of wholesalers has de-
creased .... [T]here were 2,188 wineries in the United States as of 2000, up from 579 in
1975. The vast majority of those wineries are small, producing multiple labels that the
wholesalers are not able to carry. In contrast, WSWA [Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of
America], had 450 members in 1975, down to only 170 today."
See Wine Institute Statement, E-Commerce: The Case of Online Wine Sales and Direct
Shipment (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://www.wineinstitute.org/communications/statis-
tics/dirshipl0.30.03.htm.
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ticular by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Falling on the heels
of a ground-breaking Seventh Circuit decision, 5 four circuits have found
these facially discriminatory regulatory schemes unconstitutional viola-
tions of the dormant Commerce Clause.6 Most recently, the Second Cir-
cuit joined the Seventh in finding such out-of-state direct shipment
restrictions to be constitutional exercises of state power.7
Even among the circuit majority, however, there has been a "sub-split"
in the remedy-of-choice to correct unconstitutional regulation. One rem-
edy has been to strike the direct shipment privilege in-state wineries have
enjoyed, thus resulting in the total prohibition of all direct shipments. A
very opposite approach has been to prohibit the enforcement of state
laws that ban out-of-state direct shipments, thus opening the state for di-
rect shipment. This, in effect, creates a state with unregulated importa-
tion of alcohol until the state enacts appropriate legislation to regulate
the flow constitutionally.
It is tempting to judicially extend the benefit of in-state direct shipment
to out-of-state wineries and allow the unabated flow of wine. Vineyards
and the harvesting of grapes resonates deeply with our nation's agricul-
5. See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom. Bridenbaugh v. Carter, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001).
6. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Granholm v.
Heald 124 S. Ct. 2389 (2004); Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003); Beskind v.
Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003); Bolick v. Danielson, 330 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2003)
(vacated and remanded based on Beskind); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115-16
(11th Cir. 2002) (ordering a remand because "[b]efore the State can successfully raise the
Twenty-first Amendment as a shield, it must show that its statutory scheme is necessary to
effectuate the proffered core concern ....").
7. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2391
(2004). Challenges to state laws were also brought in Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode
Island, and Washington State. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Parker v. Morrison (D.
Ariz. 2004) (No. CV03-1948 PHX EHC) (dismissing without prejudice pending Supreme
Court review); First Am. Civil Compl., Freeman v. McGreevey (D.N.J. 2003) (No. 2-
036CV03140); Civil Compl., Stahl v. Taft (S.D. Ohio 2003); Woolfson v. Carcieri (D.R.I.
2003) (No. CA03-463S) (granting motion for stay with plaintiffs' consent); Mast v. Long,
No. 02-3590, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2003) (affirming dismissal was proper because "a
district court's decision that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction [under the Tax Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 and principles of standing] ... precludes the plaintiff from relitigat-
ing the issue of jurisdiction in a later action.").
Unfortunately, the Washington District Court did not address what could prove to be one
of the most important issues in future direct shipment litigation-whether reciprocity
agreements between states are constitutional. Washington refuses to allow direct shipment
from out-of-state wineries unless the state in which the winery is located agrees to extend
reciprocal direct shipment privileges to Washington wineries. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 66.12.190 (West 2004). This scheme may be more difficult to defend than the current
wine shipment cases because Washington permits some states to ship directly into the state,
but appears to prohibit others on purely protectionist grounds.
Although this scenario has been dismissed by some as irrelevant to the current direct ship-
ment debate, Mr. Craig Wolf, General Counsel of the Wine and Spirit Wholesalers of
America ("WSWA"), a national trade association representing state-licensed liquor whole-
salers, believes a reciprocal state case could actually be the most dangerous for his organi-
zation because these reciprocal state agreements could be found to be unconstitutional and
the court remedy could be to open the state for direct shipment from every state. In other
words, if a state chooses to allow direct shipment from some states, it cannot prohibit it
from others. Telephone Interview with Craig Wolf, General Counsel, WSWA (Jan. 7,
2004). A quick and dirty PDI analysis, discussed infra, comes to the same conclusion.
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tural heritage and tradition. The domestic wine industry is revitalizing
this farming legacy,8 as well as growing a national pride in our developing
knowledge and skill in the science of horticulture and the art of winemak-
ing.9 One need look no further than the booming wine and tourism in-
dustries in the Napa and Sonoma Valleys of California to see the positive
impact wine commerce has had on that state and our nation.10 Removing
barriers to interstate direct shipment would undoubtedly help promote
this growth and prosperity. However, so long as there is a Twenty-first
Amendment, a court should not impose upon a state the unregulated free
flow of alcohol. A state should instead be afforded the opportunity to
decide for itself in what manner it wishes to control importation within
the established constitutional framework.
Under the umbrella of the Twenty-first Amendment, it is undisputed
that each state has the power to control importation and transportation of
alcohol into its borders. This power should be respected and accorded
great deference. However, its exercise must be analyzed under the
framework established by the Constitution, its accompanying jurispru-
dence, and by statutory authority, some older than the Amendment itself,
namely the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. Using this holistic approach,
there emerges a three-prong analysis to determine the constitutionality of
a state alcohol regulation. This analysis calls for an examination of (1)
the power exercised, (2) the discriminatory effect, and (3) the interest of
the state in enacting the legislation. If a state regulation is found to be
unconstitutional, judicial remedy should be restoration of constitutional
state control and not the creation of an unregulated state.
II. BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Although man is already ninety percent water, the Prohibitionists
are not yet satisfied.
John Kendrick Bangs (1862-1922)
8. Established vineyards can yield about $1800 an acre, compared to average return
of $270 an acre for corn, $221 an acre for cotton, and $77 an acre for wheat. Tex. Dep't of
Agric., Texas Wine Grape Guide, available at http://www.agr.state.tx.us/wine/docs/
grapeguide.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
Twenty years ago Washington had 12 wineries and approximately 2,500 acres of vine-
yards in production. At the end of 2003, after instituting laws to encourage the industry,
there were over 200 wineries cultivating over 29,000 acres with a $2.5 billion positive eco-
nomic impact for the state. Steven Schafersman, Proposition 11 Passes in Texas-Wineries
in Dry Counties Can Legally Sell Their Wines Directly to Consumers, TEXAS WINES (Sept.
13, 2003), available at http://www.texaswines.org.
9. Texas wines have received thousands of awards at national and international com-
petitions since 1985. See Texas Wine Grape Guide, supra note 8.
10. In California alone, nearly 11 million people visit wineries in the state annually.
These wineries produce more than 80 percent of U.S. wine and 90 percent of the nation's
wine exports. See Wine Institute Statement, supra note 4.
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A. EARLY SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE
In Craig v. Boren," the Supreme Court provided a historical perspec-
tive on Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence:
The history of state regulation of alcoholic beverages dates from long
before adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment.[12] In the License
Cases,[ 13 ] the Court recognized a broad authority in state govern-
ments to regulate the trade of alcoholic beverages within their bor-
ders free from implied restrictions under the Commerce Clause.
Later in the century, however, Leisy v. Hardin,[14] undercut the the-
oretical underpinnings of the License Cases.[ 15] This led Congress,
acting pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause, to rein-
vigorate the State's regulatory role through the passage of the Wil-
son[ 16] and Webb-Kenyon[ 17 ] Acts . . . . With passage of the
Eighteenth Amendment, the uneasy tension between the Commerce
Clause and state police power temporarily subsided.
In 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment.[ 18] The wording of [§] 2... closely follows the Webb-
11. 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). The Eighteenth Amendment insti-
tuted Prohibition in 1920 (after proposal in 1917 and ratification in 1919). In pertinent
part, the Amendment prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
liquors" and gave Congress and the states concurrent power to enforce the Amendment.
13. Citation omitted from text: 5 How. 504, 579, 12 L. Ed. 256 (1847).
14. Citation omitted from text: 135 U.S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890).
In Leisy, the Court held that a state could not regulate alcohol imported into the state in its
original package because the Court found it was up to Congress under the Commerce
Clause to regulate goods in interstate commerce or else grant the states power to do so. In
other words, a state could regulate domestic alcohol, but the Court appeared to hold that a
state could not regulate out-of-state liquor. Thus, a state effectively could not choose to be
dry.
15. Leisy, 5 How. at 579.
16. Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2004). In an effort to ensure states' rights, the Wilson
Act gave states the power to regulate imported liquor "to the same extent and in the same"
manner as domestically produced liquor. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2004). After the passage of the Wilson Act,
the Supreme Court held in Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 417 (1898), that a state did not
have the power to prevent importation of liquor, only the power to regulate its sale. Since
alcohol did not "arrive" for sale in a state until it arrived at the purchaser, the state could
not control or illegalize the flow of out-of-state liquor, which could be direct-shipped to
consumers, until in the conzumers' possession. Id. at 421-23.
Congress then passed the Webb-Kenyon Act to close this direct shipment loophole by
allowing states to regulate at their border. A state need not wait until alcohol beverages
arrive at their final destination (which would be at the consumer's home in the case of
direct shipment) to begin regulating. A state could now choose whether or not to open its
borders to imported alcohol, and if it did, it could regulate imported alcohol to the same
extent and in the same manner as its domestic counterpart though this ordinarily would be
a violation of the Commerce Clause.
18. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI. The Twenty-first Amendment, the only amendment
ever ratified by state conventions instead of by legislatures, was proposed and ratified the
same year. The Los Angeles Times reported on December 5, 1933, that Utah, one of sev-
eral western states wanting to claim the honor as the commonwealth that accomplished the
actual repeal of Prohibition, moved up its scheduled evening meeting and at 3:32 p.m.
became the thirty-sixth and last state necessary for approval. Dry Era End Proclaimed on
Utah's Ratification: Roosevelt Calls on Nation to Ban Bootlegger and Saloon's Return: Huge
Liquor Imports Authorized, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 6, 1933. "As quickly as the news of Utah's
action had been flashed over the country... the people in nearly a score of States hastened
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Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear intention of
constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established
under those statutes. This Court's decisions since have confirmed
that the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal
operation of the Commerce Clause....
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides that "[t]he transpor-
tation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in viola-
tion of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."'19
Following the repeal of Prohibition, most states instituted a three-tier
system for the distribution of alcohol within their borders in an attempt
to diffuse any concentration of power which could serve to reinstitute the
illicit liquor trade.20 A common scheme requires all liquor produced or
imported to be received first by licensed wholesalers, who then distribute
to licensed retailers, who then sell to the consumers in "bricks-and-mor-
tar" retail stores. While there are variations on this theme, the goal is to
maintain tight regulatory control over the industry by the imposition of
strict requirements such as licensing and reporting. Federal law prohibits
a "tied house" which is generally an overlap of interests in one of the tiers
into another tier.21 In addition, this system serves to ensure the collection
of state sales tax on alcohol. The Supreme Court has approved of this
distribution system as "unquestionably legitimate" to "promote temper-
ance, ensure orderly market conditions, and collect revenues. '22
It seems clear that the Supreme Court recognized at the time of Craig
v. Boren that the Twenty-first Amendment returned power to the states
after Prohibition to control the flow of alcohol within constitutional lim-
its. The Court also acknowledged that a state was not limited by the nor-
to experience tasting a drink of legal liquor. It was the first time in thirteen years, ten
months and nineteen days." Id. In twenty-eight states, however, the rule of prohibition
continued by state decree. Id. President Roosevelt pleaded that liquor purchases be made
only from dealers licensed by the state or federal governments to ensure (1) the consump-
tion of only alcoholic beverages that had passed inspection, (2) the destruction of the "no-
toriously evil illicit-liquor traffic," (3) the payment of reasonable taxes for support of the
government, and (4) the protection of "dry States from the inundation by wet States." Id.
19. Id. at 205 n.20 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2). It is also worthy to note that
an omitted section of the Amendment proposed that Congress and the states would have
concurrent power under the amendment. States' rights advocates are quick to suggest that
the omission evidences the intent to give states total control to act with impunity and leave
the federal government powerless. Many scholars and courts, however, feel there is insuf-
ficient legislative history to draw such a definitive conclusion. Common sense also suggests
that if there were even the slightest concern that such a section would prevent ratification,
it was omitted in the interest of ensuring an end to "the noble experiment." This same
strategy was used to ensure a greater likelihood of success in ratifying the U.S. Constitu-
tion by purposely omitting the controversial and divisive issue of slavery. JOSEPH J. ELLIS,
FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 17-18 (First Vintage Books
ed., Random House, Inc. 2002).
20. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004).
21. 27 U.S.C. § 205(b) (2003). Another question is how far a state can collapse its
three-tier system by permitting its licensed wine producers to become wholesalers, retail-
ers, and even direct shippers without violating this federal prohibition.
22. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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mal operation of the Commerce Clause in the same way as other
products in the stream of interstate commerce. The Court found that
since the Twenty-first Amendment uses nearly identical language as that
used in the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts (which were the most recent
laws in effect prior to Prohibition when states had the primary authority
to regulate alcohol), the Amendment affirms the prior Acts by "constitu-
tionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under those
statutes. 12 3 In other words, after the repeal of Prohibition, the Wilson
and Webb-Kenyon Acts, as well as the accompanying case law interpreta-
tions, were once again in effect-a sort of "resurrection" of the body of
law in the same way that a testator's codicil republishes and affirms his
prior will-and so long as a state acts within that framework, its actions,
otherwise unconstitutional, would be constitutional.
Together, the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts and the Twenty-first
Amendment give virtually total control to a state to regulate the flow of
alcohol into and distribution within its borders. Within this framework,
alcohol does not enjoy the same protection of free trade traditionally
given to goods in interstate commerce. If a state chooses to open its bor-
ders, the Wilson Act gives a state the power to regulate out-of-state li-
quor to the same extent and in the same manner as its domestic
counterpart. 24 Noticeably, Congress did not expressly give to states the
authority to regulate out-of-state liquor to a greater extent or to a greater
degree than domestic liquor nor beyond its own borders. This limited
grant of state power was acknowledged even by the Seventh Circuit chal-
lenge to Indiana's direct shipment prohibition.25
23. Craig v. Boren, 492 U.S. at 205.
24. Of course, imported liquor will always be subject to importation laws that are inap-
plicable to domestically produced liquor which, by definition, need not be imported.
25. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating "This
Act eliminated the privileged status of interstate sellers but did not authorize discrimina-
tion against them. See Scott v. Donald 165 U.S. 58 (1897) [other citations omitted]."). The
court held that Indiana's regulatory scheme is constitutional and authorized by the Twenty-
first Amendment "unless the state has used its power to impose a discriminatory condition
on importation, one that favors [in-state] sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in
other states." Id. at 853 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)).
Why then did the Seventh Circuit find Indiana's regulatory scheme, which the opinion
briefly mentions as permitting "local wineries, but not wineries 'in the business of selling in
another state or country' to ship directly to Indiana consumers," constitutional? Id. at 851.
While the opinion has been criticized by some, there is speculation that since the plaintiffs
were only in-state consumers and did not include any out-of-state wineries, the challenged
statutes were not shown to be unconstitutional insofar as the parties standing before the
court. Heald, 342 F.3d at 526-27 (listing a string of cities finding Bridenbaugh factually
distinguishable from other federal wind shipment cases).
The court also did not take kindly to the plaintiffs' flaunting that they had been import-
ing wine in violation of Indiana law and avoiding sales tax to boot. Because these plaintiffs
were "concerned only with direct shipments from out-of-state sellers who lack and do not
want Indiana permits," it is very likely that the court found itself in a similar position of
needing to protect a state's right to control the flow of alcohol within its borders from in-
state lawbreakers with unclean hands as the court in State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's
Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62-64 (1936) (finding the state has the power to impose and enforce
an extra licensing fee on its own in-state wholesalers for the privilege of importing out-of-
state alcohol, in addition to a licensing fee for selling alcohol which applied equally to all
2004] 1561
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The Webb-Kenyon Act then makes it absolutely clear that all state reg-
ulations are effective at the state's border. The Webb-Kenyon Act ac-
complishes this by prohibiting shipment or transportation into a state "in
violation of any law of such State. '26 The Act does not, contrary to the
suggestion of some states, pluck state power out of the established consti-
tutional framework, nor does it grant to the states a new power to enact
"any law" nor total immunity to regulate by means of "any law." The
Webb-Kenyon Act simply builds upon the Wilson Act and ensures that
constitutional laws enacted by a state cannot be circumvented. The
Twenty-first Amendment was needed to repeal the Eighteenth and to en-
sure that this framework could not be easily defeated by the whim of a
future Congress.
States and amici in the current Supreme Court appeal whole-heartedly
agree that alcohol does not enjoy the traditional interstate Commerce
Clause protection. 27 Thus, they maintain that a state has the power, with-
out consideration of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, to open its
borders and to regulate the importation of wine by prohibiting the direct
shipment of out-of-state wine. The Twenty-first Amendment framework
provides a means to control the otherwise free flow of out-of-state wine
into its opened borders by removing the special status and protection of
articles in interstate commerce. Its character then becomes that of do-
mestic wine.
But it seems that some states want their cake-or better phrased, want
their wine-and to drink it too. These states have all unquestionably
opened their borders to out-of-state wine and use their Twenty-first
Amendment power to regulate this flow. To do so, these states prohibit
the direct shipment of this wine into the state, but at the same time they
have lessened their control on domestic wine and permit direct shipment
within the state. It is as though these states want to remove the tradi-
tional interstate character and protection just to control importation, then
reinstitute the classifications of "out-of-state" and "in-state" alcohol as a
shield to attempt to justify regulating distribution of in-state and out-of-
state wine differently. Not regulating out-of-state wine in the same man-
ner or to the same extent as domestic wine, but rather to a greater extent,
seems fundamentally contrary to the limited congressional grant of au-
thority under the Wilson Act.
Admittedly, it sounds constitutional for a state to require that "every
drop" of wine sold go through its established three-tier distribution sys-
in-state wholesalers, as a substitute for the tax revenue that the state cannot impose on out-
of-state producers). Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854 (emphasis in original).
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit concluded every drop of wine sold in Indiana goes
through its state-mandated distribution system for the collection of taxes, so the court
found that no discriminatory condition was imposed on out-of-state wineries by Indiana's
regulatory scheme despite its prohibition on out-of-state direct shipment. Id. at 853.
26. 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2004) (emphasis added).
27. Brief for the Petitioners at 2-4, Heald, (No. 03-1116); Brief of Ohio and 32 Other
States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2-3, 6, Heald (No. 03-1116).
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tem. This scheme is emblazoned with equality, but it is often not so in
effect. In those three-tier states that permit in-state wineries (the pro-
ducer trier) to direct ship but contemporaneously prohibit out-of-state
wineries, in-state wines literally bypass two of the tiers (and mark-ups)
that other out-of-state products must pass through before reaching the
consumer. This, in essence, reduces in-state wines to a one-tier distribu-
tion system-much less than the state regulation imposed on out-of-state
wine and again quite contrary to the Wilson Act.
Further, in most of these states, importation is "by invitation only."
Wholesalers make label-by-label decisions on whether or not to offer im-
portation privileges to certain out-of-state wineries, while at the same
time excluding others who have no alternative means to access the very
same state market. This seems miles away from the Wilson!Webb-Ken-
yon congressional grant of authority. The decision to open a state's bor-
ders is supposed to be by state law. Importation should not be a day-to-
day business decision of state wholesalers. While the discriminatory effect
of this regulatory scheme is not evident within the state, its ramifications
are felt extraterritorially by excluded wineries throughout the nation. At
least reciprocity agreements between states (criticized by some because
these states open their borders for importation from some states while
excluding other sister states) are excluded by state law. The unfettered
power to impose arbitrary restrictions and barriers to commerce and to
exercise selective importation based on profitability or state citizenship-
one wonders if this is the result Congress had in mind.
B. LATER SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE2 8
In the ensuing years, Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence grew to
include challenges to state alcohol regulation when the exercise of power
28. Later Supreme Court jurisprudence contrasts with Court decisions immediately
following the repeal of the Prohibition in which the Court undeniably appeared to allow
state liquor regulations that violated the Wilson/Webb-Kenyon constitutional framework
discussed supra. Because earlier cases are closest in time to the ratification of the
Amendment, it has been argued that these interpretations are the most reliable indicator
of the intent of the framers of the Amendment and thus should be regarded as the more
correct application of the Amendment. This analysis, of course, results essentially in
immunity for a state when regulating alcohol.
The Supreme Court, however, retreated from this "unconditional" and absolute power to
violate the Constitution and the previously established framework. A review of these
cases, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, reveals what the Court
may really have been trying to do which was not to grant states absolute immunity, but
rather absolute power in controlling the liquor trade. See Indianapolis Brewing Co. v.
Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) ("The substantive power of the State to
prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor is undoubted."); Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62
("The amendment ... abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns intoxicating
liquors. The words used are apt to confer upon the state the power to forbid all
importations which do not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.").
In this period of transition from federal "control" of alcohol and its attendant powerful
and persistent criminal element, it was necessary for public policy reasons to sanction state
power in an effort to gain control of the illicit trade with strong regulation. Once this was
accomplished and state control was assured (which unquestionably would have taken
several years), the Court was able to bring state power back into alignment with the
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conflicted with an affirmative act of Congress or an express provision of
the Constitution. 29 Here the Court often employs a balancing test be-
tween conflicting federal and state interests to determine if a challenged
state statute can stand. The challenged state law is given greater weight
to trump the federal interest when "the interests implicated by a state
regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the [Twenty-
first] Amendment that the regulation may prevail even though its re-
quirements directly conflict with express federal policies."
30
After finding a conflict between Federal Communication Commission
("FCC") regulations and state law involving a ban on alcohol advertising
in Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, the Supreme Court used a balancing test
to decide whether the state law would prevail.31 Since there was "an im-
portant and substantial federal interest" in the "comprehensive regula-
tions developed over the past 20 years by the FCC to govern signal
carriage by cable television systems" to promote the widespread develop-
ment of cable communication, federal law pre-empted the state regula-
tion.32 Because the state was attempting to regulate outside its core
Twenty-first Amendment power to regulate the actual importation or dis-
tribution of alcohol, its interest was given very little weight when bal-
anced against the federal interests at stake.33
By the mid-1980s the influence of this balancing approach can be seen
in cases involving the Commerce Clause and its doctrinal counterpart, the
intended framework. It was at that time that the Court began to find unabated violations
of the Constitution unacceptable, even in regards to the distribution of alcohol. However,
the Court always ensured that so long as a state acted within the established Twenty-first
Amendment constitutional framework, it would be free to exercise its power. See
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964) (stating "[t]o
draw a conclusion from this line of [earlier] decisions that the Twenty-first Amendment has
somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating
liquors is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. . . . Such a
conclusion would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect.").
29. See, e.g., Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 334 (asserting that the creation of the U.S. Customs
Office rules and oversight was an affirmative exercise of the Commerce Clause to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and so a state, without an interest in preventing unlawful
diversion into its state commerce, cannot prohibit it); California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111-13 (1980) (holding the federal interest in
competition under the Sherman Antitrust Act outweighed the state's price-setting regula-
tions which were not effectively accomplishing the state's goals of promoting temperance
and protecting smaller retailers); North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 444 (plurality agreeing that
state taxes or regulations that discriminate against the federal government or those with
whom it deals are invalid under the intergovernmental immunity doctrine).
30. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984). See also Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U.S. at 97. In some of these cases the Court expressly states that a state
has "complete control" over how and whether to allow liquor to be shipped into its bor-
ders, and states in the current shipment debate often cite such authority. A better inter-
pretation would be that the Court is assuring the states that the federal government must
accept a state's constitutional exercise of its core power to regulate alcohol under the estab-
lished framework.
31. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 714, 716.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 716 (finding "the balance between state and federal power tips decisively in
favor of the federal law, and enforcement of the state statute is barred by the Supremacy
Clause").
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dormant Commerce Clause. In Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Su-
preme Court stated that the Twenty-first Amendment does not wholly
exclude a state from application of the dormant Commerce Clause even
though the doctrine was not implemented by an affirmative act of Con-
gress. 34 Hawaii imposed an excise tax on in-state and out-of-state alco-
hol, but in an effort to promote a locally-produced pineapple liquor, in-
state producers of this type of liquor were exempt from the tax. The
Court first found the discriminatory tax scheme to violate a federal inter-
est in free trade. 35 This "economic protectionism," which favored in-state
producers by placing a greater burden on out-of-state producers, facially
discriminated against out-of-state economic interests and clearly violated
the dormant Commerce Clause.36 However, instead of immediately find-
ing the statute unconstitutional and ending its analysis, the Court em-
ployed a balancing test, like the balancing employed in challenges under
other non-commerce provisions of the Constitution, to determine if there
was some other way the statute could be saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment. It is almost as if the Court is giving the state "two bites at
the apple" in an effort to find the statute constitutional without applying
a strict scrutiny standard.
To employ the balancing test, it was necessary to identify the federal
and state interests at stake. The federal interests under the Commerce
Clause were free trade and the prevention of "economic Balkaniza-
tion."'37 While the promotion of temperance was characterized as a legiti-
mate state goal in the regulation of the distribution of alcohol, 38 Hawaii's
real interest was found to be the promotion and protection of its local
liquor industry. This stated purpose was not a "core purpose" of the
Twenty-first Amendment, and "[s]tate laws that constitute mere eco-
nomic protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as
laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in
liquor."'39 Thus, the challenged statute was not related closely enough to
the powers of the state under the Twenty-first Amendment to prevail-
Hawaii was concerned more about domestic economic interests than the
actual importation of alcohol, so it carried very little weight when bal-
anced against the very great federal interest in not allowing the nation to
separate into economically self-serving, politically hostile units. The
Court took a holistic approach to its analysis of the discriminatory aspect
of the excise tax regulation; it recognized the state has great power to
34. 468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984). "[B]oth the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce
Clause are parts of the same Constitution .... [Like other provisions of the Constitution],
each must be considered in light of the other and in the context of the issues at stake in any
concrete case." Id. at 275.
35. Id. at 276.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 276. "Balkanization" is the "break[ing] up into small, mutually hostile politi-
cal units, as the Balkans after WWI." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY





regulate alcohol, but this power must be exercised within the entire con-
stitutional framework and is not without bounds.
C. CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT: RED OR WHITE?
The majority of circuits in the direct wine shipment debate have taken
a holistic approach that incorporates the traditional Commerce Clause
analysis to determine the constitutionality of state alcohol regulations by
examining the following: (1) whether the statute violates the Commerce
Clause by discriminating either directly or indirectly against out-of-state
economic interest or by imposing a burden incommensurate with putative
local gains, and if so, (2) whether the statute can be saved by § 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment. 40
Discriminatory statutes are classified into one of two categories: (1)
having a facially discriminatory purpose, or (2) having a discriminatory
effect despite even-handed regulation to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest.41 In the latter category, the regulation will normally be up-
held if the burden on interstate commerce is only incidental and there is a
legitimate local purpose.42 If the burden is clearly excessive, the Pike
balancing test is employed to determine whether the local interest out-
weighs the burden and whether the interest could be advanced with a
lesser impact on interstate commerce. 43
In the former category, statutes which are facially discriminatory have
long been held "virtually per se invalid," and a strict scrutiny test is ap-
plied. 44 "This burden is stringent: 'When a statute directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce or when its effect is to favor in-
state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally
struck down the statute without further inquiry."' 45 Under this analysis,
a state can save a facially discriminatory statute if it "can demonstrate,
under rigorous scrutiny, that [1] it has no other means to advance a legiti-
mate local interest ... and [2] of the absence of nondiscriminatory alter-
natives."'46 In the context of alcohol regulation, the statute must advance
one of the Amendment's core concerns. 47
Using this two-step analysis, the Fifth Circuit found Texas's challenged
regulatory scheme unconstitutional. Although previously prohibiting all
direct shipment of alcoholic beverages, Texas enacted a Wine Marketing
Assistance Program which had an express purpose of promoting the in-
state wine industry 48 and allowed in-state wineries to direct sell and direct
40. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Bacchus
Imports, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
41. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 270.
42. Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2003).
43. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
44. Id. (citing Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996)).
45. Id. (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579).
46. Id. (citing C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstone, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994)).
47. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 231 (2d Cir. 2004).
48. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 110.02(a) (Vernon 2004).
1566 [Vol. 57
These Grapes Are Ripe For Pickin'
ship "in an amount not to exceed 35,000 gallons [of wine] annually. ' 49 At
the same time, state law prohibited direct shipment from out-of-state win-
eries and provided no way for small wineries not included in the estab-
lished three-tier distribution system to access Texas markets.50 State law
also restricted Texas residents from personally transporting into the state
more than three gallons of out-of-state wine,51 in essence limiting out-of-
state purchases to that quantity. Plaintiffs submitted into evidence alter-
native statutory examples of non-discriminatory means to accomplish the
state's proffered concern for temperance. The court concluded the
facially discriminatory treatment of out-of-state wineries was "nothing
but a pretextual rationale.., for economic protectionism," and therefore,
not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment.52
The Eleventh Circuit also employed a two-step analysis, but it seems to
have taken an approach less than strict scrutiny when analyzing the direct
shipment issue. "Being facially discriminatory, Florida's regulatory
scheme violates the Commerce Clause unless the statute advances a legit-
imate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives. ' 53 "Legitimate" purpose and "reasonable"
alternatives do not seem to rise to the level of the Fifth Circuit's "core"
purpose and "absence of any available alternatives" approach, but rather
feels more like the balancing test the Court previously employed.
On the opposite side of the fence, the Second Circuit discarded the
majority's two-step analysis as "flawed because it has the effect of unnec-
essarily limiting the authority delegated to the states through the clear
and unambiguous language of section 2 [of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment]."'54 At first blush, the court, like the Seventh Circuit, appears to
take a straightforward, one-step approach to determining the constitu-
tionality of a state's direct shipment regulation simply by inquiring
"whether the challenged statute is within the ambit of [the Twenty-first
Amendment's grant of] authority, such that it is exempted from the effect
of the dormant Commerce Clause."' 55 Finding that a state may regulate
the importation and distribution of alcohol as it chooses without regard to
the dormant Commerce Clause and limited only by the caveat that it
"may not intrude upon federal authority to regulate beyond the state's
borders or to preserve fundamental rights," the court held the New York
regulatory scheme constitutional even though New York law restricts true
out-of-state wineries from direct shipping to consumers while in-state
49. Id. § 16.01.
50. Id. § 107.07(f).
51. Id. § 107.07(a).
52. Dickerson, 336 F.3d at 406-07. The Fifth Circuit had previously decided and fol-
lowed the reasoning in Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding provi-
sions of Texas's alcohol code unconstitutional because "the statutory barrier Texas has
erected ... results in shielding the State's operators from the rigors of outside competition.
This rule subjects such laws to the Commerce Clause's insistence on nondiscrimination.").
53. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 2002).




wineries may do so. 56
While the court theoretically could have ended its analysis here be-
cause no federal authority was involved and the state's exercise of power
under the Twenty-first Amendment supposedly trumped any applicability
of the dormant Commerce Clause, the court still felt compelled to show
that the New York regulatory scheme is non-discriminatory, necessary,
and not intended to favor local interests over out-of-state interests.57 The
court explained that unlike other states that have been considered at the
circuit level, New York technically has not barred out-of-state wineries
from direct shipment because its regulatory scheme provides a means for
an out-of-state winery to direct ship just like an in-state winery if it like-
wise establishes a physical presence in the state. 58 New York "has corre-
lated its relaxation of regulatory scrutiny [allowing the direct shipment of
wine] with a safety net ensuring accountability-presence. '59 The court
believed the state's claim that it would be virtually impossible for the
state to ensure compliance with its laws without this physical presence
requirement. In essence the court said that even if the dormant Com-
merce Clause applies, there is no discriminatory aspect to the regulation,
so it is still constitutional. And even if the regulation is discriminatory,
the state's interests are in ensuring accountability and control, not eco-
nomic protectionism, so again, it is constitutional. The court applied the
Bacchus two-step.
In summarizing nearly a half century of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
the Bacchus Court stated "[i]t is by now clear that the [Twenty-first]
Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic bever-
ages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause."'60 The Amendment did
create an exception to the Commerce Clause-a state has the power to
regulate, even prohibit, the otherwise free flow of alcohol in interstate
commerce-but states must exercise their power to regulate the importa-
tion and distribution of alcohol within a holistic framework that includes
the entire Constitution and the many laws and doctrines that flow from it.
If a state has decided to engage in interstate alcohol commerce, its
grant of authority under the Twenty-first Amendment should not extend
to discriminating against or arbitrarily precluding out-of-state producers
from competing in the marketplace. When a winery is not invited to sell
56. Id. at 233.
57. Perhaps the court went to this trouble in case the Supreme Court finds that the
dormant Commerce Clause is applicable and applies the two-step analysis on appeal. This
seems to be to no avail, however, because "state statutes requiring business operations to
be performed in the home State [such as New York's physical presence requirement] that
could more efficiently be performed elsewhere... ha[ve] been declared to be virtually per
se illegal." Id. at 238 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)).
58. Id. Such physical presence requires the winery to maintain a branch office and a
separate, fully-staffed warehouse facility where its wine is to be delivered before shipment
to the consumer. This essentially makes an out-of-state winery an in-state winery. It also
requires a tremendous capital outlay impossible for most small wineries. Petitioners' Brief
at 6, 22, Swedenburg (No. 03-1274).
59. Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 238.
60. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275.
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its products in a state by the wholesaler importation tier and the winery is
unable to direct ship or otherwise participate in a state-sanctioned means
to access the market, surely this is economic Balkanization at its finest.
Besides, if Bacchus or any other court decision that recognized a limit on
state power to regulate alcohol was wrongly decided as the Michigan
brief suggests,61 Congress could have acted to better clarify the parame-
ters of state power as happened after Leisy.
III. THE FEDS WEIGH IN
Wine is the most civilized thing in the world.
Ernest Hemingway (1899-1961)
Congress has not remained silent on the subject of alcohol regulation.
The Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act, effective January 2001,
provides a federal forum for state attorneys general to bring a civil action
for injunctive relief against a person if there is "reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a person is engaged in, or has engaged in, any act that would
constitute a violation of a state law regulating the importation or trans-
portation of any intoxicating liquor."' 62 The Act, however, expressly
states that federal jurisdiction only extends to a state law that is a valid
exercise of power under the Amendment as "interpreted by the Supreme
Court ... including interpretations in conjunction with other provisions
of the Constitution of the United States."'63 Also, the Act "shall not be
construed to grant to States any additional power."' 64 This federal legisla-
tion, though claimed to bolster state power by some state defendants, is
not substantively determinative of whether a state law passes "constitu-
tional muster."'65
More recently, President George W. Bush signed legislation (herein
called the "Direct Shipment Provision") that permits, "during any period
in which the Federal Aviation Administration ["FAA"] has in effect re-
strictions on airline passengers to ensure safety," a consumer who
purchases wine while physically present at a winery to direct ship the
wine back to their residence if the purchaser could have hand-carried the
wine lawfully into their home state.66 There are other requirements such
as: (1) the purchaser must provide verification of legal age to purchase
alcohol at the winery; (2) the shipping container must be marked to re-
quire an adult signature upon delivery and; (3) the wine must be for per-
61. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Heald (No. 03-1116) (noting the dissenting opinion in
Bacchus opined "the question is not the appropriate degree of deference to state law nor of
the Amendment's core purposes, but whether or not 'the provision in this case is an exer-
cise of a power expressly conferred upon the States by the Constitution."').
62. 27 U.S.C. § 122a(b) (2003).
63. Id. § 122a(e)(1).
64. Id. § 122a(e)(2).
65. Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 768 (S.D. Tex. 2002), affd 336 F.3d 388
(5th Cir. 2003).




sonal use only and not for resale.67 Any violation of these terms allows a
state attorney general to bring a civil action under section 2 of "[a]n Act
divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases"
approved March 1, 1913-our old friend the Webb-Kenyon Act.68
The Direct Shipment Provision (backed by Senator Dianne Feinstein
(D-Cal.) and Representative Elton Gallegly (R-Cal.), who not surpris-
ingly represent the state with the largest number of wineries, and Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.),
chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary committees, respectively)
was in response to media reports and consumer comments that some air-
lines were prohibiting passengers from carrying wine on board because of
security precautions instituted after September 11, 2001, particularly limi-
tations relating to size, number, and type of carry-on bags.69 Wineries in
California became concerned that such carry-on restrictions would re-
duce on-site purchases, so trade groups such as the Wine Institute and the
American Vintners Association began lobbying Congress to address the
issue.70 "In a situation where the state allows for people to carry some-
thing on their person back home, they should be allowed to ship the same
equivalent amount back when there is a restriction on carry-on baggage,"
advocated Steve Gross, state relations manager for the Wine Institute.71
The enactment obviously will not conflict with state laws that prohibit
personal importation (the law only allows direct shipment of the amount
of wine already allowed to be carried into the state under current state
law) or in states that already permit direct shipments of wine (unless the
amount that could be hand-carried was more than the amount permitted
to be direct-shipped). It will, however, impact "at least 12 states that
don't allow direct shipments, but do allow limited personal importation.
It is going to result in significant change in some of the states that are
tough on shipping .... In Florida, which is a felony state [meaning that
wineries that violate the state's shipping ban are subject to felony
charges], you're allowed to bring back up to 1 gallon of wine for personal
use, so residents will be able to ship back that equivalent. In Texas, it's 3
gallons. Vermont is 6 gallons."' 72 Even in states with limited direct ship-
ment to wet areas, there may be conflict with local dry laws.
"Ultra vires! Underhanded!" countered Mr. Craig Wolf, General
Counsel for Wine and Spirit Wholesalers of America, Inc. ("WSWA"). 73
WSWA is a national trade association representing the wholesale tier of
the alcohol industry that works to preserve the three-tier distribution sys-
67. Id. § 124(a)(2)-(4).
68. Id. § 124(b).
69. Dana Nigro, Congress Passes Measure Temporarily Easing States' Wine-Shipping
Restrictions, Wine Spectator Online, Oct. 4, 2002, at http://www.winespectator.com!Wine/
Daily/New/0,1145,1849,00.html.
70. Id. The Wine Institute is a San Francisco-based association of more than 600
wineries.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting David Sloane, president of the American Vintners Association).
73. Telephone Interview with Craig Wolf, General Counsel, WSWA (Jan. 7, 2004).
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tem common in many states "that has served consumers and states well
for seventy years."'74 WSWA has fought in Congress and the federal
courts against any interstate shipping which results in bypassing its mem-
bers' tier in the traditional distribution scheme. 75
Wolf and the WSWA do not believe the federal government had the
authority to enact such legislation, and words like "federal supremacy"
and "federal interest in national security" do not seem to matter. 76 "The
Constitution provides that the rules under which alcohol may be deliv-
ered into a state are a matter of state law .... Those who believe the
DOJ Reauthorization language [the Direct Shipment Provision] would
operate to override state laws prohibiting direct shipment are mistaken.
A federal statute simply cannot override the Constitution and its delega-
tion to the states of the right to determine how alcohol may be delivered
to its citizens. Therefore, in states where direct shipping is prohibited, it
will remain so."77
WSWA does have a valid point. As concluded earlier, Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence still seems to indicate that so long as a state
constitutionally exercises its authority to regulate the distribution of alco-
hol (i.e., within the established constitutional framework, the state's cho-
sen statutory scheme cannot be run roughshod over by the federal
government). In North Dakota, the state was minding its own business
and regulating alcohol by requiring that all liquor sold in the state go
through its three-tiered distribution system. 78 Two military bases were
located in the state where the United States sold liquor to military per-
sonnel and their families.79 In 1986, Congress passed a law requiring the
Department of Defense ("DOD") to purchase distilled spirits (hard li-
quor, but not wine or beer which it continued to purchase in-state) from
the most competitive source, and so DOD "developed a joint-military
purchasing program to buy liquor in bulk directly from the Nation's pri-
mary distributors who offer the lowest possible prices" to then ship to the
military base.80 At the same time, North Dakota enacted a labeling and
reporting regulation requiring out-of-state distillers who sell liquor di-
rectly to a federal enclave to affix a specified label to each individual item
identifying it for consumption only within the federal enclave.
To make a long plurality opinion short, the state's labeling regulation
74. WSWA, Direct Shipment of Alcohol to Consumers, available at http://www.wswa.
org/public/policy/direct.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
75. Id.
76. Telephone Interview with Craig Wolf, General Counsel, WSWA (Jan. 7, 2004).
Mr. Wolf's organization was given no notification about the proposed regulation and
speculates the short provision was "snuck in" as part of the much larger Department of
Justice appropriations bill (which even the author will admit was difficult to find without a
cite).
77. Dana Nigro, supra note 69 (quoting Juanita Duggan, CEO and Executive Vice
President, WSWA).
78. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 426 (1990).




was found to be within its core Twenty-first Amendment power.81 In
light of evidence of large quantities of liquor being diverted into other
states' local liquor markets from federal enclaves, the state had a very
important interest in preventing the diversion of illegal liquor into its ci-
vilian market, and therefore it was hard to disagree that state liquor con-
trol policies "should not be set aside lightly."'8 2 Because the state labeling
regulation was found not to be discriminatory against the federal govern-
ment, in the sense that the government could choose to buy non-labeled
liquor from in-state wholesalers like everyone else was required to do,
and because Congress had not spoken otherwise, state law was not pre-
empted. 83 The federal government must abide by state law imposing only
a slightly burdensome sticker requirement in light of such an important
state interest.84
One can almost hear Justice Scalia behind the bench speaking the
words in his concurring opinion, "The Twenty-first Amendment . . . is
binding on the Federal Government like everyone else."' 85 While federal
immunity is well-established for liquor taxation, which he finds "at least
arguably consistent" with the text of the Twenty-first Amendment, fed-
eral immunity from state alcohol importation regulation is not.86
So does that mean the federal government cannot impose the direct
shipment of wine for personal use upon a state that has expressly decided
against it? Should a constitutional challenge to the Direct Shipment Pro-
vision ever be brought by a state, the federal government will surely ar-
gue the law was an affirmative exercise of its power and therefore any
conflicting state law will be overridden by the Supremacy Clause despite
the Twenty-first Amendment.
The state, seeking to protect its established and legitimate liquor distri-
bution system and laws, will counter that importation is a core power of
the state. Assuming arguendo that the laws are otherwise within the con-
stitutional framework, the federal government cannot interfere. State al-
cohol regulations have been forced to yield in the face of an affirmative
exercise of the federal Commerce Clause power, however, these cases
were not directly related to importation, which is unquestionably re-
served to the state under the Amendment. In addition, the wine allowed
to be direct-shipped under the provision is not being imported or used by
the federal government; it is for personal use only. The Direct Shipment
81. Id. at 432.
82. Id. at 433. "a. Diversion of alcohol off a federal enclave in Hawaii by a dependent
of a Department of Defense employee in quantities large enough to supply the depen-
dent's own liquor store in the private sector." Id. at 433 n.5.
83. Id. at 439-40.
84. Because five companies had refused to fill orders for the federal government due
to the sticker requirement and one had increased its prices, four of the Justices felt the
burden on the government was not at all de minimis and unacceptably interfered with
federal procurement. Id. at 458-459 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
85. Id. at 447.
86. Id. at 448.
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Provision is a case of the federal government imposing its will on a state
that is doing no wrong. Let us not forget that North Dakota won.
The federal government will then remind the state that North Dakota
had a very real cause for concern in light of the evidence presented-
quite unlike the interests at stake with the Direct Wine Shipment Provi-
sion. Here, the federal law is only a temporary measure in times of
heightened national security, and the federal government has counter-
vailing interests of public safety in air travel and Oust in case that is not
important enough) protection from another terrorist attack. The state's
interest in preventing the diversion of a whopping three or six gallons of
wine into the local market, even multiplied by the number of unassoci-
ated purchasers who take advantage of the Direct Shipment Provision,
cannot hold a candle to the federal interest.
Besides, is it really an imposition of federal will when the state has
already agreed to allow the consumer to hand-carry the amount into the
state anyway? It seems more a matter of procedural convenience than
anything substantive. After all, the wine that is hand-carried into the
state is probably in the trunk of a car as it goes over the border: Is that
really very much different than a direct shipment of wine crossing the
border in the back of a UPS truck, particularly when measures have been
instituted to ensure the wine is not diverted into the local market and the
state can collect taxes?
And even if the smart people at the state attorney general's office try
to convince the court that the real "federal" interest in pushing through
the Direct Shipment Provision was to protect the California wine and
tourism industries and that such an interest, while sincere, does not give
the federal government power to infringe on another state's importation
laws, there is nonetheless an undeniable, overarching federal interest in
the health of the national economy. Again, the federal interest seems
superior and may prevail. Using solely a balancing approach, a state may
not be able to prevent direct shipments of wine into its state. The feds
would be toasting victory.
IV. PDI ANALYSIS
One not only drinks wine, one smells it, observes it, tastes it, sips
it, and one talks about it.
Edward VII (1841-1910)
A. A BIG PICTURE APPROACH
While no definitive conclusion can be drawn about how a court may
decide a challenge to the Direct Shipment Provision, the preceding hypo-
thetical scenario serves to demonstrate the many dimensions and tensions
within Twenty-first Amendment legal analysis. Conflicts can arise be-
tween the federal government and a state government, between states,
between in-state and out-of-state parties, and even between a state and its
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own residents. Supreme Court cases, of course, only look at one piece of
the puzzle at a time, which has resulted in decisions and enunciated tests
and accompanying dicta that appear to conflict over time. In reality, what
is happening is that slowly the pieces of the big puzzle are coming to-
gether. In some cases, the Court only needs to look at a part of the larger
analysis to decide a case, but this does not mean that the larger analysis
or other pieces of the puzzle are not still out there, waiting to be used in
an appropriate case.
In attempting to synthesize this body of law, there emerged a three-
prong analysis, hereinafter called the "PDI" analysis, which attempts to
present a complete picture of Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence by
asking three questions:
(1) Power-Is the state exercising a core, fundamental power rooted
in the Twenty-first Amendment?
(2) Discrimination-If exercising a core power, does the exercise of
that power result in direct or indirect discrimination to interstate
commerce or to the federal government?
(3) Interest-If discriminatory, do the purported interests (taking
into consideration any attendant burdens) that the state is at-
tempting to protect outweigh the interests brought by the chal-
lenging party and are therefore justified?
Cases enter the analysis at Prong 1 where the issue to be decided is
whether the state exercised power rooted in the Twenty-first Amendment
to enact this particular piece of legislation. Quite simply, the case is not
to be decided under the Twenty-first Amendment if it is determined that
the state's power to regulate comes from some other source of authority
apart from the Amendment. Directly regulating the actual importation
and transportation of alcohol into the state certainly is a core power be-
cause it is expressly stated in the text of the Amendment. Another piece
of the puzzle suggests that establishing and protecting an alcohol distribu-
tion system within the state is also a core power.87 This power to imple-
ment and enforce the Amendment, without which the other powers are
unsecured, logically and closely flows from it.
States have suggested core powers that also include "promoting tem-
perance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenues" 88 in
connection with the manufacture, shipment, and use of alcoholic bever-
ages. It can be persuasively argued, however, that these are not core
powers whose sole source of authority is derived from the Twenty-first
Amendment, but rather valid interests89 of the state (to be considered in
Prong 3, if necessary), and therefore, do not implicate the Amendment.
When one compares the language of the Eighteenth and the Twenty-first
Amendments, the prior amendment expressly prohibited the manufac-
ture, sale, transportation, importation, and exportation of intoxicating li-
87. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 716 (1984).
88. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
89. Id.
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quor90 while the latter amendment only refers to transportation and
importation for delivery or use therein. 91 Noticeably absent is the power
under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the manufacture, sale,
and exportation of liquor. This is not to say that a state does not have the
power to regulate or tax in these areas; however, the authority to do so
finds its roots in the state's police and other powers and not in the
Amendment. Any state action to regulate alcohol that is not plainly in
the areas of importation or transportation into a state is not a core power
and does not carry with it any exception to the normal operation of the
Commerce or Supremacy Clauses and must instead pass constitutional
muster under established jurisprudence for whatever source of power the
state is exercising. The state must defend its law under tests and limits
that are associated with that particular exercise of power and not the
shield of the Twenty-first Amendment. 92
In Prong 2 there are several pieces of the puzzle still missing, but if the
alcohol importation regulation does not discriminate against interstate
commerce or the federal government (or those with whom the govern-
ment deals) or impede affirmative federal action, the regulation should
stand as constitutional without further inquiry and the court should exit
from the PDI test. This proposal is true to the constitutional framework
and assures a state that so long as it regulates within these limits, its con-
trol over importation and transportation of alcohol into its borders will be
respected.
A state could, in theory, choose to be dry by prohibiting liquor coming
into and within the state. 93 Of course, this would never happen today,
but not because a state does not have the power to do it. It is perhaps
more believable to hypothesize that a state may choose to prohibit all
direct shipment of alcohol. Again, so long as this legislation is not di-
rectly or indirectly discriminatory to the federal government or to other
states' alcohol to a greater extent than in-state alcohol, it would be within
the constitutional framework and upheld as constitutional. If, however,
the court finds the regulation discriminatory, the court should proceed to
Prong 3 to decide the regulation's fate.
In Prong 3 the court balances the state's purported interest and pur-
pose in enacting the law against the interests asserted by the opposing
party. Again, there are still many pieces of the puzzle missing as to what
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
92. For instance, Craig v. Boren involved the sale of alcohol and so the state had no
protection under the Twenty-first Amendment from the Equal Protection Clause. See 429
U.S. 190, 208-09 (1976). North Dakota v. United States, however, directly involved impor-
tation and so the Amendment served to protect the state regulation from even the federal
government. See 495 U.S. at 433.
93. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) ("Without doubt a state may abso-
lutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their transportation, sale, or possession, ir-
respective of when or where produced or obtained, or the use to which they are to be put.
Further, she may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions
and exercise full police authority in respect of them.").
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weight is to be given different interests or concerns, but it is clear eco-
nomic protectionism is nearly weightless.94 On the other hand, protec-
tion from unlawful diversion of alcohol into the state's regulated market
carries a great deal of weight.95 The prevention of monopolies and tied
houses has also been found to be an important interest. 96 The weight to
be given any purported interest will rest on a case-by-case factual deter-
mination, but there are guideposts from prior cases which can assist in the
balancing and the relative weights to be given to each interest.
Some circuits in the current wine shipment cases, such as the Fifth,
have used a strict scrutiny test upon finding the state's regulations directly
discriminate against out-of-state wineries. This is black-letter law for
Commerce Clause analysis. However, use of an approach more akin to
the Eleventh Circuit's in Bainbridge when analyzing a state's exercise of a
core power under the Twenty-first Amendment provides greater defer-
ence and respect to state law. When finding the prohibition on direct
shipment by out-of-state wineries to be facially discriminatory and to
favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, the court
states the proper test to determine constitutionality to be "[o]nly if such a
regulation is shown to 'advance[ ] a legitimate local purpose that cannot
be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative' will it
be upheld. '97
This test puts the burden on the State to raise a "core concern" to
"show its statutory scheme is genuinely needed to effectuate the prof-
fered core concern. '98 "This evidentiary standard is far less than the
strict scrutiny required under a traditional ... analysis of discriminatory
laws. For example, the state need not show that there are no nondiscrimi-
natory alternatives available." 99 In other words, when exercising its
heightened authority under the Twenty-first Amendment, a state must
only show that its need to regulate in a discriminatory fashion is legiti-
mate and outweighs the interest raised by the challenging party. It need
not pass a strict scrutiny review to be upheld, but rather only provide
evidence of a worthy interest that can be found to outweigh the opposing
interest asserted. This approach recognizes that while a state's power to
regulate the importation of alcohol is not completely immune from the
operation of the Commerce Clause, it should be given greater deference
and less scrutiny than when regulating other goods.
The important thing to see in the PDI analysis is that the power of the
state is distinct and separate from the purposes or interests of the state.
This distinction tends to get muddled and courts sometimes struggle to
94. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. 263, 276.
95. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 433.
96. S.A. Discount Liquor, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 709 F.2d 291,
293 (5th Cir. 1983).
97. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1109 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing New Energy Co.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
98. Id. at 1114 n.17.
99. Id.
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determine if what the state did can be "saved by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment." In actuality what the court has done is: (1) Power-decided the
state had exercised a core power under the Twenty-first Amendment; (2)
Discrimination-decided, however, the exercise was discriminatory and
not within the constitutional framework or impeded affirmative federal
action; and (3) Interest-is now giving the state the opportunity to show
good reason why the court should allow the state to exercise its power
anyway. As alluded to earlier, this is almost a "second bite at the apple"
approach that in essence allows for the state to exercise its power just
outside the constitutional framework if there is good reason. I believe
this is what the Court meant when it referred to state interests being "so
closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment
that the regulation may prevail." 100
B. HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION
Consider now the Direct Shipment Provision by looking at a state law
that allows some hand-carrying but prohibits all direct shipment and now
conflicts with federal law. Must the state law fall in the face of the Provi-
sion? Under the PDI analysis, Prong 1 is met because regulating the im-
portation of wine is unquestionably an exercise of state core power under
the Twenty-first Amendment. Continuing to Prong 2, a strong case can
be made for the state that its prohibition on direct shipment is not dis-
criminatory and does not impede the federal government. First, the state
is not interfering with the federal government's ability to import or trans-
port alcohol. The state law also does not impede the federal government
in ensuring air traffic safety. Carry-on limitations, which may impede air-
line passengers from traveling with as much baggage, address these secur-
ity issues regardless of state law. Unlike North Dakota, the Direct
Shipment Provision deals only with personal importation, and the federal
government, including the FAA, is not burdened any more or less as a
result of a state law which merely denies the convenience of direct ship-
ment to its own residents. Lastly, because Congress did not expressly
state any economic purpose for its enactment of the provision, it cannot
be said Congress affirmatively acted to protect the national economy.
The PDI analysis would conclude that the state law, if otherwise consti-
tutional, should be respected. The federal government cannot force di-
rect shipment of wine for personal use upon a state contrary to its
importation laws enacted under the authority of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. The court would exit the PDI test and not proceed to Prong 3
because there is no need for the state to defend its proper exercise of
power under the Twenty-first Amendment.101
100. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 714.
101. If Congress had stated that its purpose was to promote interstate commerce in
wine, the PDI analysis would proceed to Prong 3 to weigh the federal and state interests at
stake. The true federal purpose in economically protecting wine-producing states, a nearly
weightless interest, probably would not be able to outweigh the remaining states' interest
in maintaining control of wine importation.
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C. DIRECT SHIPMENT APPLICATION
The current direct shipment question can be analyzed under the same
PDI analysis. Beginning with Prong 1, regulating the importation of alco-
hol is unquestionably a core power of the state under the Twenty-first
Amendment, so we quickly move to the next question. Prong 2 should
find the prohibition on direct shipment by out-of-state wineries, while
contemporaneously permitting direct shipment by in-state wineries, to be
undeniably discriminatory because it does not extend a benefit to inter-
state commerce which has been extended to intrastate commerce. 10 2
Moving to Prong 3, even giving the state a second bite at the apple, it is
difficult to see how a state interest can outweigh the strong federal inter-
est in the protection of the nation's economy and the freedom to engage
in interstate commerce, absent some extenuating circumstance. A state's
economic protectionism is by now a well-known, nearly weightless inter-
est. The promotion of temperance is not an easily defendable purpose in
this instance because that state has previously enacted legislation that al-
lows direct shipment by in-state wineries, thus the state has already "de-
regulated" wine by easing access and promoting purchase and consump-
tion. As the Texas District Court pointed out, "there is no temperance
goal served by the statute since Texas residents can become as drunk on
local wine ... as those that ... are in practical effect kept out of state by
the statute. ' 10 3 States have thus been forced to try to find other, more
convincing purposes to sustain their discriminatory regulation.
One such argument has been the state's need to collect tax revenue and
the inability to do so from out-of-state wineries, particularly on internet
sales. However, many states have already imposed requirements for the
collection of taxes on out-of-state wineries as a condition of being li-
censed direct shipper, just as is imposed on in-state wineries, with no con-
stitutional challenge. 10 4 In addition, reciprocal states generally exempt
each other from tax collection in a sort-of "it's a wash" philosophy, par-
ticularly since the amount of tax revenue generated by direct shipment is
relatively small.10 5 A state's unwillingness, or delay, to enact such legisla-
102. The State of Texas might choose to differ. Texas conceded that its regulatory
scheme did indeed treat out-of-state wineries differently than in-state wineries. Texas ar-
gued this is acceptable, however, because "[d]ifferent, but equal, is not discrimination."
Defendant's Cross Motion with Brief for Summary Judgment at 25, Dickerson v. Bailey,
212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (No. H-99-1247).
Perhaps it is the similarity to the "separate, but equal" mantra of the civil rights era that
makes this argument suspect (or even offensive) from the outset, but regardless, the dis-
trict court was not convinced.
103. Dickerson, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 710.
104. Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 30, 2003)
(statement of Todd Zywicki, Dir. of the Fed. Trade Comm'n's Office of Policy Planning),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/031030ecommercewine.htm.
105. Should Texas enact such licensing legislation, it was estimated by the Comptroller
of the State that revenues would only be approximately $60,000 per year. Telephone Inter-
view with Sherry Muller, Chief of Staff for Tex. Sen. Frank Madla (San Antonio) (Jan. 29,
2004).
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tion to effectively collect tax revenue from out-of-state wineries is proba-
bly not a legitimate reason that can outweigh the interest asserted by
plaintiffs to engage in otherwise lawful interstate commerce.
A second argument is based on the state's interest in the safety and
welfare of its citizens. The state claims a need to prohibit the direct ship-
ment of out-of-state wine to ensure alcohol, particularly wine ordered
over the internet, does not fall into the hands of minors. Although these
very real concerns are appropriately raised in state and amici briefs, 10 6
the argument loses much of its strength because the state has already
allowed the direct shipment of wine to consumers by in-state wineries
anyway. These briefs passionately address the dangers of direct ship-
ment, but at times seem to forget that the state has already instituted
direct shipment and that potential risks exist regardless of whether it is
in-state or out-of-state wine being delivered by a carrier, such as Federal
Express. The state has already decided there are effective means to mini-
mize these risks or else it would not have allowed direct shipment in the
first place. 10 7 Perhaps the state realized what common sense and prior
experience tells each of us about teenage experimentation with alcohol-
to raid mom's liquor cabinet or to "convince an older guy in the 7-Eleven
parking lot to go in and buy them a six-pack of cheap beer they can drink
immediately" is a lot easier than "to order up a case of booze on the
Internet (using the credit cards their parents gave them at age 10), wait
seven to 10 business days for it to arrive (praying all the while that the
UPS guy will show up when their parents aren't home to intercept it) and
then stash the goods under their bed until party time rolls around. '10 8
Recognizing the potential seriousness of the risk, however, many
states, including those that allow only in-state direct shipment, have insti-
tuted safety precautions and procedures to ensure minors do not receive
direct shipments of wine, such as shippers labeling the package as wine
and only using licensed carriers who must see adult identification upon
delivery. States could impose these very same safety requirements on
out-of-state wineries in its licensing requirements to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its residents. The state not having done so, how-
106. "These diverse organizations [from the Michigan Association of Secondary School
Principals to the National Association of Evangelists] have come together as Amici to op-
pose the efforts of Respondents to invalidate state statutes regulating the direct shipping of
alcohol, which would cause a major increase in the number of alcohol-related traffic fatali-
ties, injuries, assaults, and other crimes, especially among our youths." Brief of Mich.
Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals... as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, Heald
(Nos. 03-1116 and 03-1120).
Even if statistical evidence or projections could be provided to give some idea of what a
"major increase" might be, "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubi-
ous business." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 204.
107. At last count, 26 states allow some form of direct shipment. This is an increase
from only 19 states in 1999. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 7-12, Swedenburg, 124 S. Ct.
2927 (2004) (No. 03-1274).
108. Not this again. (Wise and Otherwise), 84 WINES & VINES, Issue 12, Dec. 1, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 14568248.
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ever, is no excuse to use potential lawbreaking as the grounds to forbid
an otherwise lawful activity.
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) addressed the sensi-
tive issue of underage accessibility to alcohol in its recently-conducted
study on potential anticompetitive barriers to e-commerce. 10 9 The study
examined several different industries across the country, one of which
was the wine industry (referred to as the "Wine Report"), to determine
the possible detrimental effect of state policies and legislation on online
sales, out-of-state suppliers, and consumers. 110 The FTC takes no posi-
tion on the constitutional issues raised in the ongoing direct shipment
controversy and is clearly a "pro-commerce" government agency. The
Commission, however, conducted a thorough investigation, soliciting in-
put from many different perspectives (including online companies, bricks-
and-mortar businesses, consumer groups, academics, state officials, and
others) in its efforts to impartially address states' public policy
concerns.
111
In regards to underage drinking, the Wine Report found that among
states that allow direct shipment, few, if any, experienced problems with
shipment to minors.1 2 Some reasons suggested were the delay and addi-
tional shipping expense of ordering wine online and the lack of necessity
for shipping because 68-95% of high school students in a 2002 survey
indicated alcohol was already "easy" or "very easy" to get.11 3 Overall,
the FTC found state regulations "may have legitimate consumer protec-
tion rationales, [but] many of them also have the effect of insulating local
businesses from out-of-state competitors. '114
A state's interest in protecting its citizens from a perceived evil should
not be taken lightly by the court, but playing on the public's fears of
largely speculative and preventable dangers should not be used as a pre-
text for economic protectionism. Importation and distribution are within
a state's Twenty-first Amendment core power to regulate, but the consti-
tutional framework does not absolutely immunize a state from the opera-
tion of the Commerce Clause, including the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine. A state that has chosen to allow importation may not legislate
outside the established constitutional framework unless justified by an
important and legitimate state interest. •
109. FTC Staff Report, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E-Commerce: Wine (July
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OO3/O7/winereport2.pdf.
110. Id. at 2.
111. Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 30, 2003)
(statement of Todd Zywicki, Dir. of the Fed. Trade Comm'n's Office of Policy Planning),
available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/O31030ecommercewine.htm.
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY: STATE CONTROL
OR UNREGULATION?
I drink wine when there is an occasion, and sometimes when there
is no occasion.
Miguel de Cervantes (1547-1616)
A. THREE STATES TAKE CHARGE
Should a state's regulatory scheme be found unconstitutional, the
proper remedy should be, if possible, to restore constitutionality in favor
of state control and against the unregulated interstate flow of wine. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found North Carolina's direct shipment
prohibition on out-of-state wineries unconstitutional.1 15 However, the
court reasoned that since (1) the state's alcohol and beverage code
("ABC"), which originally prohibited all direct shipments, had been in
effect since 1937; and (2) over forty years had passed before the chal-
lenged provisions which provided a local preference for direct shipment
were enacted, the appropriate remedy, contrary to what the district court
had ordered, was to strike the later-added direct shipment section to re-
store constitutionality. 116
North Carolina convincingly argued that the district court order to
strike five core statutes prohibiting the direct shipment regulations from
the ABC and enjoining enforcement effectively "eviscerates the Twenty-
first Amendment insofar as that amendment safeguards North Carolina's
right to regulate the transportation and importation of wines by out-of-
state dealers. If the Order stands, the State can no more regulate direct
shipments of wine by gigantic wine warehouse dealers than it can by little
wineries." 117 It described the district court order as unconstitutional it-
self because "it substantially eradicates the State's authority guaranteed
by the Twenty-first Amendment. 1 18 Although the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized the plaintiffs' frustration and sincere interest in enjoying the direct
shipment of out-of-state wine, the court felt bound by comity and har-
mony to "disturb[ ] only as much of the State regulatory scheme as is
necessary to enforce the U.S. Constitution."' 19 As such, the court pre-
sumed North Carolina would want to preserve the most and destroy the
least of its ABC and therefore struck the in-state direct shipment provi-
sions. With this choice of remedy, "North Carolina retains great flexibil-
ity to determine what sort of relief to provide to cure the discriminatory
treatment. '120 This remedy restored the state to control, avoiding the
unregulated flow of wine into the state, while at the same time giving the
state the opportunity to legislatively decide whether and how to regulate
115. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2003).
116. Id. at 519.
117. Id. at 518.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 519.
120. Id. at 520.
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direct shipment of wine. Although this may take some time, the judicial
remedy of restoring the state to a constitutional state of control enables
the state to address importation issues in an orderly fashion without the
risks of an unregulated liquor industry.
Interestingly, Virginia argued in the Fourth Circuit the very same day
as North Carolina.121 Seeing the handwriting on the wall, Virginia and
South Carolina had just enacted statutes that allowed the direct shipment
of wine by out-of-state wineries. 122 North Carolina soon followed. 123
These states, and others like them, are working productively and cooper-
atively by choosing to regulate out-of-state wineries thoroughly and effec-
tively, but equally and fairly. They have realized the positive economic
impact of a thriving wine industry and have not allowed the strong alco-
hol wholesaler lobby to defeat their citizens' efforts in promoting both
their local and the national wine industries by enacting constitutional di-
rect shipment legislation.
B. SOUR GRAPES IN TEXAS
1. A State of Unregulation
Quite the contrary has taken place in Texas. Because of the remedy
employed by the Fifth Circuit, Texas currently has an unregulated, free
flow of direct-shipped wine into the state. With an appellate court injunc-
tion preventing the enforcement of challenged direct shipment laws, a
state legislature that is out of session until 2005,124 and a new state consti-
tutional amendment that grants the state legislature the power to over-
ride local law,125 Texas is a mess. Things are further complicated by the
existence of "wet" and "dry" areas as a result of local option elections.
State officials are threatening prosecution to violators of wine shipment
laws, 126 so many wineries and common carriers are refusing to ship into
and within the state out of fear of breaking the law127-but there is un-
certainty and disagreement over what the law is. Even worse, the in-state
wineries, which Texas's citizens agreed were worth a constitutional
amendment to protect and promote, are now at a real economic
121. Bolick v. Danielson, 330 F.3d 274, 274 (4th Cir. 2003).
122. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4.1 - 112.1 (Michie 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-745 (Law.
Co-op. 2003).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1001.1(a) (2004).
124. The Texas legislature convenes in regular session on the second Tuesday in January
of each odd-numbered year. TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 301.001 (Vernon 2003). In addi-
tion, the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission will be abolished absent legislative action
by a sunset provision on September 1, 2005. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon
2003).
125. Tex. Const. art. 16, § 20(d).
126. Telephone Interview with Lou Bright, General Counsel, Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
Comm'n (Jan. 2004).
127. UPS will not ship wine within, into, or out of Texas. Transportation of Alcoholic
Beverages, available at http://ups.com/content/us/en/resources/service/terms/alcohol.html
(last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
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disadvantage. 128
2. The Local Effect of Prohibition
After the repeal of Prohibition, Texas required local option elections to
permit the sale of different classes of alcoholic beverages.' 29 As a result,
Texas has a rather confusing hodge-podge of local liquor laws. Some wet
counties, justice of the peace precincts, and incorporated cities or towns,
depending on the geographic parameters of the local option election con-
ducted often decades ago, permit the sale of wine, while others which are
dry do not.130 Because of the difficulty in knowing for sure whether a
residential address is wet for wine and therefore legal for delivery, some
shippers and wineries do not want to assume the risk of criminal liability
and loss of license for delivering an "illicit beverage." 13 1 Though dry ar-
eas may never enjoy direct shipment under the Fifth Circuit ruling, the
geographic uncertainty of wet area boundaries has placed a formidable
obstacle to Texans' ability to enjoy direct shipment of out-of-state wine
even though it is not against the law in wet areas.
3. Texas Wine Marketing Act and Proposition 11
In 2001, the Texas legislature began taking the Texas wine industry seri-
ously. Realizing that twenty years ago Texas and Washington State each
had twelve wineries with 29,000 acres under production, but that Wash-
ington's enactment of favorable legislation had resulted in a $2.5 billion
annual economic impact on the state's economy from its local wine indus-
try versus Texas's only $133 million, Texas decided it was time to promote
its local wine industry as well.1 32 The Texas Wine Marketing Act was
passed, allowing all wineries in the state, whether in wet or dry counties,
to sell wine on their premises, called "on-site" or "tasting room" sales,
and to direct ship to Texas residents those purchases made in person at
the winery. 133 Purchases made by phone, fax, or e-mail order are shipped
to participating package stores which then make arrangements with the
purchaser for pick-up or delivery.13 4
128. Matt Stiles, State wineries feel all bottled up, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept.
21, 2003, at 31A.
129. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.03(d)-(f) (Vernon 2003).
130. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 251.01, 251.18, 251.71 (Vernon 2003).
131. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 1.04(4) (Vernon 2003).
www.wine.com, an online wine sales website, claims it can find a carrier to ship to those zip
codes in wet areas listed on its website. See http://wine.com/cs/ShippingReturns.asp (last
visited Aug. 31, 2004). The website, however, is reportedly a creature of the alcohol whole-
sale industry, which actually ships first to a wholesale or retail member of the state's distri-
bution system who then (after making his share of the profit) direct ships to the customer's
home. Telephone Interview with Sherry Muller, Chief of Staff for Tex. Sen. Frank Madla
(San Antonio) (Jan. 29, 2004).
132. Steven Schafersman, Texas Wines, Sept. 13, 2003, available at http://www.texas-
wines.org.
133. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 110.053(a)(1), 107.12 (Vernon 2003).
134. Id. § 110.053(2).
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Because on-site purchases of wine are considered by statute to be made
at the winery, deliveries could be made to residents who live in dry areas
without violating local law.135 No distinction is made in the statute
whether the purchaser lives in a wet or dry area. In fact, the website of
the Texas Department of Agriculture, charged with the implementation
of the Wine Marketing Act, clearly states that "Texans who visit a winery
and make purchases in person can have them shipped directly home.' 36
Fearing there was a "legal cloud" over this legislation because it was in
direct conflict with local laws that prohibited the sale of wine in dry areas
(which is where over half of Texas wineries are located), Texans were
asked in 2003 to approve Proposition 11, a constitutional amendment that
would give the state legislature the authority to enact laws regulating win-
eries throughout the state uniformly. 137 Over 62% of Texas voters sup-
ported the Proposition.138
4. State Control: A Better Approach
In Dickerson, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
certain Texas Alcohol and Beverage Code ("TABC") provisions were un-
constitutional, but only as applied to plaintiffs, who lived in wet areas,
and enjoined the state from enforcing discriminatory provisions in the
TABC against out-of-state wineries. In crafting a remedy, the court
stated, "In cases like this, our constitutional role is clear: We should en-
force the constitutional right only by nullifying, or enjoining the enforce-
ment of, the offending statutes."'139 With this remedy, the court chose to
extend the benefit of direct shipment to out-of-state wineries and to allow
the Texas legislature to later choose to impose burdens, (e.g., regulations
equally "leaving to Texas's legislature its freedom to act in its proper ca-
pacity in deciding whether to restrict or further expand the benefits that it
has already created for in-state wineries"). 140
The problem with this remedy is that until such time as Texas decides
what to do, there is absolutely no law in place to control the direct ship-
ment of wine into wet areas, and arguably the entire state. The Texas
Wine Marketing Act is still in effect after the Fifth Circuit ruling, so it
seems a very strong case could be made that out-of-state wineries should
also be permitted to direct ship to Texas residents even in dry areas if
they purchased the wine in person at the winery. The fundamental pre-
mise underlying Dickerson is that out-of-state wineries must have the
same benefits as in-state wineries, and since Texas wineries can direct
135. Id. § 110.053(f).
136. Texas Dep't of Agric., Texas Wine Marketing Assistance Program, available at
http://www.agr.state.tx.us/wine/index.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
137. Raise Your Glass, Cast Your "Yes" Vote for Proposition 11, AUSTIN-AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 2003, at E2, available at http://www.twgga.org/dynpage2.php?pgid=
propllAS.
138. Office of the Sec'y of State, Race Summary Report, Sept. 13, 2003, available at
http://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist.exe
139. Id. at 409 (emphasis in original).
140. Id.
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ship purchases made in-person, out-of-state wineries should be extended
the same privilege. In fact, this was the original interpretation of the
TABC Commission. 141 It quickly retreated from this position however
and now says that while it cannot stop direct shipments to residents who
live in wet areas like the Dickerson plaintiffs, the code provisions are am-
biguous in regard to residents who live in dry areas.1 42
As a corollary to the unregulated flow of wine into the state, there also
now exists in Texas a "reverse-discrimination" whereby in-state wineries
are subject to regulation, but the out-of-state wineries are not. 143 Unlike
out-of-state wineries, Texas wineries are heavily regulated under state law
and are unable to direct ship to customers who phone, fax, or e-mail or-
ders.1 44 Even worse, in the absence of state legislation, no applicable
statutory permitting requirements or importation regulations exist for
out-of-state wineries who direct ship into the state. With no state legisla-
ture in session until 2005 and no administrative agency able to enact laws,
one can begin to appreciate the difficulty Texas is having as a result of the
chosen judicial remedy.
The better approach for the Fifth Circuit would have been to restore
constitutional control in favor of the state. This would have allowed the
Texas legislature to determine the best course of action, taking into con-
sideration all of the state's interests while maintaining orderly market
conditions. Of course, the risk of returning power to the state is that the
legislature will never again enact laws to allow for the direct shipment of
wine. The state-mandated control of the importation and distribution of
alcoholic beverages is, bottom-line, big business, 145 and the wholesaler
lobby has traditionally been very influential politically in trying to protect
141. Telephone Interview with Sherry Muller, Chief of Staff for Tex. Sen. Frank Madla
(San Antonio) (Jan. 29, 2004).
142. Telephone Interview with Lou Bright, General Counsel, Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
Comm'n (Jan. 2004).
143. Matt Stiles, State Wineries Feel All Bottled Up, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 21, 2003, at 31A.
144. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 110.053(a)(2) (Vernon 2003).
145. WSWA generates $34 billion in wine and spirit sales to retailers each year and
assists in the annual collection of $3.8 billion in federal tax revenues. WSWA, Bringing
You Life's Memorable Moments, available at http://www.wswa.org (last visited Aug. 31,
2004).
In an attempt to compete with this financial and political clout, small wineries have formed
alliances to aggregate resources. Family Winemakers of California, an association of more
than 600 wineries, many of which are small producers who do not have national distribu-
tion but instead sell their wine through direct shipment and on-site direct sales (sometimes
called "tasting room sales"), provided a grant to enable the Coalition for Free Trade
("CFI."), a non-profit group which coordinates legal challenges to the bans on direct ship-
ment of wine to consumers' homes throughout the nation, to hire Kenneth Starr as a na-
tional legal strategy advisor. Mr. Starr, perhaps best known as the independent prosecutor
during the Clinton presidency, is a former U.S. appeals court judge and also a former U.S.
Solicitor General under former President George Bush who has argued twenty-eight cases
before the Supreme Court, several of which were Commerce Clause cases involving con-
flicts between federal and state law. "Although the [Twenty-first] Amendment grants
states the right to control sales of alcohol within their borders, the constitutional amend-
ment does not abolish the rest of the Constitution," he stated to Wine Spectator. Dana
Nigro, From Whitewater to Wine: Kenneth Starr Joins Direct-Shipping Fight, Wine Specta-
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their legal monopoly as appointed gatekeepers of the states' alcohol dis-
tribution systems. This has resulted in resistance to the enactment of di-
rect shipment legislation in which products and profits completely bypass
the wholesale tier. But evidence indicates that the tide is beginning to
turn. States across the country are enacting constitutional direct ship-
ment laws. Even Texas came as close as it ever had to enacting such
legislation in 2003.146 In addition, reciprocity legislation, though not yet
constitutionally challenged, is shared by over a dozen states in the nation.
Orderly change is taking place across the country.
While it is true that the Fifth Circuit gave Texas citizens in wet areas
the ability to access out-of-state wine by direct shipment, the court did
much more harm than good by not respecting the state's authority in de-
cisions regarding the importation and distribution of alcohol. No state
should ever be put in a position of unregulation and reverse discrimina-
tion as long as there is a Twenty-first Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Everyone brings out the choice wine first and then the cheaper
wine after the guests have had too much to drink, but you have
saved the best until now.
John 2:10, NIV
Michigan and New York are now in the spotlight. While some have
forecasted victory for the states based on the composition of the current
U.S. Supreme Court and its strong leaning toward state dignity under the
Eleventh Amendment, 147 there is great legal weight and authority, some
older than the Twenty-first Amendment itself, that should convince the
Court that while state control of the importation and transportation of
alcohol should be respected, there are limits on state exercise of power
under the Twenty-first Amendment. In addition, any judicial remedy im-
posed should favor constitutional state control. 148
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00.html.
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